Bisimulations, behavioral equivalence and logical equivalence are investigated for stochastic image-coalgebras that interpret coalgebraic logic which is defined in terms of predicate liftings. We investigate the conditions for the functor under which these notions of equivalence are related by discussing congruences for the underlying stochastic relation. It is demonstrated that logics as diverse as continuous time stochastic logic and general modal logics can be usefully approached through coalgebraic methods.

We propose a probabilistic interpretation of Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL). We show that logical and behavioral equivalence are equivalent over general measurable spaces. This is done first for the fragment of straight line programs and then extended to cater for the nondeterministic nature of choice and iteration, expanded to PDL as a whole. Bisimilarity is also discussed and shown to be equivalent to logical and behavioral equivalence, provided the base spaces are Polish spaces. We adapt techniques from coalgebraic stochastic logic (...) and point out some connections to Souslin's operation A from descriptive set theory. This leads to a discussion of complete stochastic Kripke models and model completion, which permits an adequate treatment of the test operator. (shrink)

We generalize stochastic Kripke models and Markov transition systems to stochastic right coalgebras. These are coalgebras for a functor with as an endofunctor on the category of analytic spaces, and is the subprobability functor. The modal operators are generalized through predicate liftings which are set-valued natural transformations involving the functor. Two states are equivalent iff they cannot be separated by a formula. This equivalence relation is used to construct a cospan for logical equivalent coalgebras under a separation condition for the (...) set of predicate liftings. Consequently, behavioral and logical equivalence are really the same. From the cospan we construct a span. The central argument is a selection argument giving us the dynamics of a mediating coalgebra from the domains of the cospan. This construction is used to establish that behavioral equivalent coalgebras are bisimilar, yielding the equivalence of all three characterizations of a coalgebra’s behavior as in the case of Kripke models or Markov transition systems. (shrink)

This article compares representations of war in Walter Flex’ The Wanderer between Two Worlds, Ernst Jünger’s Storm of Steel, and Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front. It shows the extent to which these representations are shaped by political and ideological convictions. The difference between the romantic idealism of Flex and Jünger’s “soldierly nationalism”,which he proposed as a model for the time to come, reflects a major shift during World War I itself. By contrast, neither past (...) nor future seem to be of any use in Remarque’s famous antiwar novel, in which the war generation surprisingly is described as having nothing else to live for beyond the present, i.e. beyond war. Finally, the article suggests how these different representations of war each, in their own way, contributed to the aesthetics and ideology of fascism. (shrink)

Nothing less than a manifesto for a new social and psychological revolution to save our threatened planet, this book is a summary of the penetrating thought of ...

Excerpt from Kant Contra Haeckel: Fur den Entwicklungsgedanken, Gegen Naturwissenschaftlichen Dogmatismus Meine Schrift wendet sich an die, welche, geblendet von Haeckels beruhmtem Namen und wohlverdientem wissenschaftlichen Ruf, auch in philosophischen Fragen von ihm Auskunft erwarten. Sie mochte den philosophischen Nimbus, der ihn umgibt, zerstoren und so an ihrem Teil der Vernunft zum Durchbruch verhelfen. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical (...) work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Mit diesem Band legt Ernst A. Schmidt seine Forschungen über 'das Leere' in Antike und Früher Neuzeit vor. Schmidt behandelt zunächst die Atomistik von Leukipp bis Lukrez, die Porentheorie von Empedokles bis Heron von Alexandria sowie die Theorie des Philoponos. Dem schliesst sich eine Untersuchung zur Rezeption der antiken Konzepte in der fru·hneuzeitlichen Physik (Galilei, Gassendi, Henry More) an. Im Anhang bringt Schmidt eine kritische Darstellung des antiken Atomismus in drei Texten des 18. Jahrhunderts, bei Polignac, Wieland und Le (...) Sage. Es gibt bislang keine vergleichbar umfassende und quellengesättigte Arbeit zum Thema. Wer sich für 'das Leere' interessiert oder nach Quellen sucht, wird von Schmidt bestens versorgt. In this book Ernst A. Schmidt, emeritus of Classical Philology at Tübingen University, presents his research on the subject of "the void" in antiquity and early modern times. Schmidt first deals with atomistics from Leucipp to Lucretius, the pore theory from Empedocles to Heron of Alexandria, and the theory of Philoponos. This is followed by an investigation of the reception of ancient concepts in early modern physics (Galileo, Gassendi, Henry More). In an appendix the author offers a critical account of ancient atomism in three texts from the 18th century by Polignac, Wieland and Le Sage. There is no comparably comprehensive and source-saturated work on the subject to date. Anyone interested in "the void" or looking for sources will be well served by Schmidt. (shrink)

This paper discusses the possibility of finding an ethic of at least partial and perhaps ever-growing content in a world not that of moral strangers (where we have nothing except our desire to live freely to unite us) and one of moral friends (in which values, goals and ways of doing things are held in common). I argue that both the world of moral strangers which Engelhardt's world view would support, as the world of moral friends which is the one (...) Pellegrino seeks both are untenable and that furthermore both can lead to a similar state of affairs. I suggest a dynamic world of moral acquaintances in which different belief systems and ways of doing things can come to some broad agreements about some essential thing. This is made possible because although we do not share the intimate framework Pellegrino might suggest, yet we are united by a much broader framework than the one moral strangers share. (shrink)

© The Author [2017]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected] Dedekind was a contemporary of Bernhard Riemann, Georg Cantor, and Gottlob Frege, among others. Together, they revolutionized mathematics and logic in the second half of the nineteenth century. Dedekind had an especially strong influence on David Hilbert, Ernst Zermelo, Emmy Noether, and Nicolas Bourbaki, who completed that revolution in the twentieth century. With respect to mainstream mathematics, he is best known for his (...) contributions to algebra and number theory. With respect to logic and the foundations of mathematics, many of his technical results — his conceptualization of the natural and real numbers, his analysis of proofs by mathematical induction and definitions by recursion (extended to the transfinite by Zermelo, John von... (shrink)

This paper briefly reviews the papers in this special section of HCA and makes the point—a point which should be obvious—that statistics are useful only as guidelines but tell one nothing about the individual patient in front of you. Chronological age merely shows what is true of most but decidedly not of all patients in a particular age group. To ration on the basis of age alone is unfair to the individual denied treatment and damaging to the community because it (...) disturbs the solidarity which comes about because most members of the community feel that the community has obligations beyond those of not directly harming them; indeed, what produces solidarity is the feeling that members of a community will do their best to come to each others help. Rationing on the basis of age alone denies people of equal treatment under the law and—when it comes to the elderly—is a type of age discrimination. It is pointed out that what matters is a patient’s disease and not his/her age. A permanently vegetative person 8 years of age is a much sadder occurrence than it would be at age 90—but the critical fact is that both are permanently vegetative. Age cuts both ways—it is irrational to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars, untold amounts of time, energy and devotion to the 520 gm infant with a gr IV diffuse haemorrhage whose chance of leading a sentient life is close to zero and to hesitate before using a diagnostic MRI on a patient who is 90 but fully alert and enjoying life. It is concluded that age as an independent variable in the allocation of resources is ethically highly problematic. (shrink)

Motivated by the search for a logic for polynomial time, we study rank logic which extends fixed-point logic with counting by operators that determine the rank of matrices over finite fields. WhileFPRcan express most of the known queries that separateFPCfromPtime, almost nothing was known about the limitations of its expressive power.In our first main result we show that the extensions ofFPCby rank operators over different prime fields are incomparable. This solves an open question posed by Dawar and Holm and also (...) implies that rank logic, in its original definition with a distinct rank operator for every field, fails to capture polynomial time. In particular we show that the variant of rank logic${\text{FPR}}^{\text{*}}$with an operator that uniformly expresses the matrix rank over finite fields is more expressive thanFPR.One important step in our proof is to consider solvability logicFPSwhich is the analogous extension ofFPCby quantifiers which express the solvability problem for linear equation systems over finite fields. Solvability logic can easily be embedded into rank logic, but it is open whether it is a strict fragment. In our second main result we give a partial answer to this question: in the absence of counting, rank operators are strictly more expressive than solvability quantifiers. (shrink)

Posings as such form part of hierarchic thinking and prevailing practices and are thus subsumed in negativity. Idle talk, seemingly dimming one's view, has been replaced by hallucination, dreams, and illusions. It is so very difficult to see through them and to realize that there is nothing there but them.

The present paper attempts to show that a 1915 article by Erich Kretschmann must be credited not only for being the source of Einstein’s point-coincidence remark, but also for having anticipated the main lines of the logical-empiricist interpretation of general relativity. Whereas Kretschmann was inspired by the work of Mach and Poincaré, Einstein inserted Kretschmann’s point-coincidence parlance into the context of Ricci and Levi-Civita’s absolute differential calculus. Kretschmann himself realized this and turned the point-coincidence argument against Einstein in his (...) second and more famous 1918 paper. While Einstein had taken nothing from Kretschmann but the expression “point-coincidences”, the logical empiricists, however, instinctively dragged along with it the entire apparatus of Kretschmann’s conventionalism. Disappointingly, in their interpretation of general relativity, the logical empiricists unwittingly replicated some epistemological remarks Kretschmann had written before General Relativity even existed. (shrink)

Erich Fromm was a political activist, psychologist, psychoanalyst, philosopher, and one of the most important intellectuals of the twentieth century. Known for his theories of personality and political insight, Fromm dissected the sadomasochistic appeal of brutal dictators while also eloquently championing love--which, he insisted, was nothing if it did not involve joyful contact with others and humanity at large. Admired all over the world, Fromm continues to inspire with his message of universal brotherhood and quest for lasting peace. The (...) first systematic study of Fromm's influences and achievements, this biography revisits the thinker's most important works, especially _Escape from Freedom_ and _The Art of Loving_, which conveyed important and complex ideas to millions of readers. The volume recounts Fromm's political activism as a founder and major funder of Amnesty International, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, and other peace groups. Consulting rare archival materials across the globe, Lawrence J. Friedman reveals Fromm's support for anti-Stalinist democratic movements in Central and Eastern Europe and his efforts to revitalize American democracy. For the first time, readers learn about Fromm's direct contact with high officials in the American government on matters of war and peace while accessing a deeper understanding of his conceptual differences with Freud, his rapport with Neo-Freudians like Karen Horney and Harry Stack Sullivan, and his association with innovative artists, public intellectuals, and world leaders. Friedman elucidates Fromm's key intellectual contributions, especially his innovative concept of "social character," in which social institutions and practices shape the inner psyche, and he clarifies Fromm's conception of love as an acquired skill. Taking full stock of the thinker's historical and global accomplishments, Friedman portrays a man of immense authenticity and spirituality who made life in the twentieth century more humane than it might have been. (shrink)

Der Biologe Erich Wasmann SJ ging in seinem Buch “Die moderne Biologie und die Entwicklungstheorie” und in seinen Berliner Vorträgen 1907, in denen er sich mit dem Monisten Ernst Haeckel auseinandersetzte, das Problem der Evolution an. In Bezug auf die Entwicklung des Menschen vertrat er in beiden eine offene Position: Er hielt die Entwicklung des Menschen aus dem Tierreich für nicht erwiesen, rechnete jedoch damit, dass sie eines Tages bewiesen werden könnte, und betonte, dass sie nicht prinzipiell der (...) Offenbarung widerspreche. Dies führte zu Klagen in Rom. Der Jesuitengeneral Wernz erklärte, es sei “theologice certum”, dass der Mensch auch dem Leibe nach nicht aus dem Tierreich abstammen könne. Wasmann solle daher in künftigen Neuauflagen seines Buches nur die biologische Seite behandeln und Spekulationen über die prinzipielle Vereinbarkeit einer Humanevolution mit der Offenbarung unterlassen. Dies hatte zur Folge, dass es keine Neuauflage mehr gab.The Jesuit and biologue Erich Wasmann dealt in his book “Die moderne Biologie und die Entwicklunstheorie” and in his Berlin conferences in 1907, dealing with the monist Ernst Haeckel, the problem of evolution. Regarding the evolution of mankind, he defended an open position: he judged that it had not been proved, but reckoned with the possibility that it could be proved one day, and insisted that there would be no contradiction with Christian revelation. That provoked, in the time of the Modernist crisis, complaints to Rome. The Jesuit General Wernz declared that it would be “theologice certum” that mankind could not descend, not even regarding the body, from animal ancestors. Therefore Wasmann should deal, in future editions, only with the biological questions and omit speculations about the theoretical compatibility of human evolution with the revelation. That had the consequence, that no new edition of the book was ever published. (shrink)

As frequently pointed out in this discussion, one of the most characteristic features of Mayr's approach to the history of biology stems from the fact that he is dealing to a considerable degree with his own professional history. Furthermore, his main criterion for the selection of historical episodes is their relevance for modern biological theory. As W. F. Bynum and others have noted, the general impression of his reviewers is that “one of the towering figures of evolutionary biology has now (...) written a towering history of his discipline.”138 Bynum is here referring to The Growth of Biological Thought, but this observation holds equally true for Mayr's other historical writings: One must surely read this book [One Long Argument] not only for its content in itself, but for what it tells of its author. And certainly as one does so, one comes away full-handed. Many, if not all, of the disputes and controversies that have driven Mayr through his long intellectual life reappear, stated as forcefully and elegantly as ever.139Up to this point, most reviewers agree; the bone of contention is, rather, how to evaluate Mayr's historical work, considering this observation. The two related characteristics of his work-I will call them subjectivity and presentism-stand in opposition to a widespread approach in the history of science exemplified by Kuhn's suggestion that “insofar as possible..., the historian should set aside the science that he knows. His science should be learned from the textbooks and journals of the period he studies.”140 There are, however, historians who consider the close connection between Mayr and the subject matter of his historical studies to be an advantage.141On the other hand, it is assumed that the connection between past and present must result in a distortion of the historical truth and lead to a historiographical fallacy, commonly referred to as “Whig history”. Herbert Butterfield, who in 1931 gave the term its now generally accepted meaning, believed that “real historical understanding is not achieved by the subordination of the past to the present, but rather by our making the past our present and attempting to see life with the eyes of another century than our own”142. Unfortunately, Butterfield's definition of what he considers Whig history remains somewhat vague, and modern authors have emphasized what they consider most important. Butterfield's “subordination of the past to the present” is referred to in respect to the selection of subjects (there are more biographies of Charles Darwin than of, let's say, Louis Agassiz),143 to the evaluation of historical authors,144 or, more generally, to all kinds of histories “with one eye, so to speak, upon the present.”145 The underlying tendency of Whig historians is to produce a “historical account told from the viewpoint of those in power,”146 leading to a “glorification of the present.”147 It is obvious that Mayr's strongly presentist approach to the history of biology can be called Whiggish, if we apply the criteria of “selection” or “reference.” However, it might be worth mentioning that the program of writing a strictly historicist account of the history of science is challenged by various authors.148 For Mayr, it is not only legitimate but necessary to compare the present situation with the past. “Whiggish” is only the evaluation of an author in terms of our time.149I cannot discuss the Whit/anti-Whig controversy in any detail here, apart from saying that Mayr has defended himself rather extensively against the charges of being Whiggish.150 Nevertheless, it may be useful to touch on some of the criticisms that are predominant in reviews of his writings. First, we encounter the notion that historians can write a true and convincing historical account only if they have no personal interest or interpretation of their own; Mayr, on the other hand, because he “has such strong interpretations of his own, ... cannot possibly convince everyone that he is right about everything.”151 It makes one wonder, what historian has ever been able to convince everyone that he or she is right about everything? But apart from this peculiar idea, it unquestionably poses certain dangers if the subject matter of historical scrutiny and the author are identical. At the same time, this identity brings certain advantages with it, especially firsthand experiences of the period in discussion. Whether these personal memories ultimately result in a distorted picture of the past has to be decided in every particular instance. The notion that a scientific study can be conducted by a completely detached observer from a neutral standpoint has been shown to be impossible in physics, and it is also an illusion in historiography. The question is not whether, but which kind of interest are the underlying motivation for a historian. At this point, Mayr is ahead of his critics when he suggests that our understanding of the past always has a subjective component: The main reason, however, why histories are in constant need of revision is that at any given time they merely reflect the present state of understanding; they depend on how the author interpreted the current zeitgeist of biology and on his own conceptual framework and background. Thus, by necessity the writing of history is subjective and ephemeral.152Second, the temporal proximity between the event and the historical analysis makes difficulties inevitable and will finally result in certain false assessments. But this applies to all historians when they discuss recent problems, regardless of whether they are personally involved or not: As long as the battle between Darwinism and Lamarckism was raging, it was quite impossible to undertake an unbiased evaluation of Lamarck. ...[The] definite refutation of Lamarck's theory of evolutionary causation clears the air. We can now study him without bias and emotion and give him the attention that this major figure in the history of biology clearly deserves.153Third, Mayr is primarily interested in biological problems and not, for instance, historiographical, sociological, or psychological questions. Several authors have remarked that since the beginning of the professionalization of the history of science in the 1960s, a rift between two groups has developed, resulting from the heterogeneous professional backgrounds and interests of the people involved: the authors who were originally biologists and became interested in the history of their discipline only later on, and the authors who were trained as historians.154 Whereas the first group, the “biologists,” tend to be laymen in history proper, the “historians” are in most cases laymen in biology. Different professional backgrounds obviously shape the historical perspective in both groups, but neither approach is necessarily superior. The great number of important books in the history of biology written by “biologist” documents how valuable this point of view can be. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the writings of biologists in the history of science tend to have a strong “internalist” tendency and often neglect the professional, cultural, and political context of science. Mayr's approach is that of a “biologist”; it is “internalist,” and typical for scientists who turn to the history of their discipline.I want to conclude my analysis with a quotation from a review by Douglas J. Futuyma, which gives a perceptive glimpse of Mayr's personality and style: One cannot help standing in awe of the germanic capacity for vast, allembracing synthesis: consider the lifelong devotion of Goethe to Faust, or Wagner's integration of the arts into a Gesamtkunstwerk in which all of human history and experience is wrought into epic myth. It is perhaps in this tradition that Ernst Mayr's The Growth of Biological Thought stands: a history of all of biology, a Ring des Nibelungen complete with leitmotivs such as the failures of reductionism, the struggle of biology for independence from physics, and the liberation of population thinking from the bounds of essentialism.155 Within this style of thinking Mayr has “to offer...nothing less than a vision of biology that places neodarwinian evolutionary theory firmly at the centre.”156 There may be other visions of biology, but few of them have as indefatigable and able representatives as Darwinism has in Ernst Mayr. (shrink)

In this article, I aim to raise questions for natural theology by casting doubt on the intelligibility of absolute limit concepts, like ‘reality’, through comparing the reception of Wittgenstein by two English Dominicans, Cornelius Ernst and Herbert McCabe. First, I briefly examine the evolution of the Tractarian conception of a limit that demarcates sense from nonsense as it morphs in Wittgenstein’s middle period before being abandoned entirely. Ernst is consciously aware of this shift and concerned about its implications (...) for theology. After establishing Ernst’s more wary reading of Wittgenstein, I then consider McCabe’s approach to the question of God as a question regarding absolute limits. Ultimately, I suggest that the sheer nonsense of such terms fails to provide a basis for natural theology, but that divine revelation can legitimise this talk of limits by revealing the absolute contingency of all ‘created’ things as an eschatological limit placed upon history from within history. Ironically, though, McCabe’s eschatological vision is not the crossing of this limit, but its inevitable erasure when we find that God is not ‘other’ but ‘all in all’. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to put Ernst Bloch’s philosophy to a test suggested by Hans Blumenberg in The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. According to Blumenberg, modernity constitutes the second, successful, attempt at overcoming Gnosticism, after the first attempt, undertaken by Christianity, had failed. However – Blumenberg argues – it was not modern philosophy, but only science which had managed to escape Gnosticism’s ontological trap of viewing the world as an illusion bordering on nothing.

*Weitere Angaben Inhalt: Nimmt man Reinholds Behauptung ernst, wonach es >der vornehmste Zweck der Philosophie ist, der Menschheit über die Gründe ihrer Pflichten und Rechte in diesem, und ihrer Erwartung für das zukünftige Leben allgemeingiltige Aufschlüsse zu geben, erscheinen seine Hauptwerke aus der Jenaer Zeit in neuem Licht. Nicht nur die frühen Merkur-Briefe, auch der Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens und die Revisionsarbeiten an der Elementarphilosophie vom Sommer 1792 erscheinen dann als eminent praktisch motiviert. Der erste Teil (...) der Untersuchung liefert eine Interpretation von Reinholds Grundlinien der Theorie des Begehrungsvermögens und ihrer Stellung innerhalb des Versuchs von 1789. Es wird nachgewiesen, daß dieses Kapitel das Resultat der unüberwindlichen Schwierigkeit ist, den Gedanken einer absolut freien Tätigkeit innerhalb einer umfassenden Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögens auszudrücken. Der zweite Teil der Arbeit geht den Konsequenzen dieser Schwierigkeit für Reinholds Philosophie bis 1792 nach - der begrifflichen Trennung von Willen und praktischer Vernunft und der Aufwertung des gemeinen Verstandes gegenüber der philosophierenden Vernunft - und argumentiert schließlich, daß Reinhold schon im Sommer 1792 den Grund für seine Preisgabe der Elementarphilosophie. (shrink)

He’s a terrible fellow, but at least he’s got substance.—Erich Auerbach on HeideggerMy esteemed colleague Purushottama Bilimoria drew my attention to Shane Mackinlay’s ‘Heidegger’s Temple: How Truth Happens when Nothing is Portrayed’. My friend wondered whether my piece on ‘The Origin of the Work of Art: Heidegger’ in Sophia 51, no.4 (2012): 465–478 was a reply to Mackinlay. It was not.I had not in fact read Shane Mackinlay’s elegant essay. Having read it now, I do not entirely agree with (...) it: Nor he, with my essay, no doubt. The Republic of Letters is wide open.The point perhaps that Bilimoria wanted to me to consider was that Mackinlay makes much of ‘nothing’, as did Bilimoria himself in his arrestingly titled, ‘Why is there Nothing rather than Something?’ (Sophia 51, no.4 (2012): 509–530). He, in conversation, has wanted me to make more of—the concept of?—nothing than I am accustomed to do. I doubt if I can rise to the challenge, beyond the Oxbridge ‘I don’t quite understand…’. If ev. (shrink)

Dear Professor Heller . . . Your paper had started out superbly. It was a great aesthetic and cognitive pleasure to follow you as you guided us through the intellectual history of the main idea of Kleist's essay, from Plato through the biblical Fall of Man, to Schiller, and Kierkegaard, and Kafka. Indeed the perceptive listener's experience was so satisfying that his disappointment was doubled when he came to realize that all this erudition and beauty had been displayed only in (...) order to serve as a contrast-providing background for the sharp delineation of a reductionistic explanation which you consider to be characteristic of psychoanalysis: the interpretation of the disturbance of man's naive, unselfconscious pre-Fall state as nothing more than a portrayal of sexual impotence—the reduction of a deep existential preoccupation to a case of phimosis. I am certain that the relief I felt when you then took up Freud's demonological-neurosis paper was not an idiosyncratic response on my part but an experience shared by many open-minded listeners in your psychoanalytic audience. Let us, therefore, disregard the "text" of your sermon and consider the substantial questions that you raised after you turned to Freud; these are to my mind the most central ones that you undertook to examine in your—despite its disappointing aspects—splendid address to us. Put into my own words, your most important question was this: What is the purpose of the psychoanalyst's efforts outside the clinical setting, in particular when his contributions take the form of a pathography? That is, To what end do analysts study the psychopathology of the creators of great works? I, too, have asked myself this question, and since you read my old essay "Beyond the Bounds of the Basic Rule" , you know some of my answers. But important basic questions are hardly ever answered once and for all; and I will, therefore, under the impact of your lecture, respond as if I had heard the question for the first time. Heinz Kohut, M.D., is Professorial Lecturer in Psychiatry at the University of Chicago and a teacher and training analyst at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis. His works include The Restoration of the Self, The Analysis of the Self: A Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders—which has appeared in German, French, and Italian translations—, The Restoration of the Self and collection of his essays, Scientific Empathy and Empathic Science. His "A Reply to Margret Schaefer"" was published in the Spring 1978 issue of Critical Inquiry. See also: "Psychoanalysis and the Marionette Theater: Interpretation is Not Depreciation" by Margret Schaefer in Vol. 5, No. 1. (shrink)

The ancient Greeks already used to give ethnic names to their different scales, and observations on differences in music of the various nations always raised the interest of musicians and philosophers. Yet, it was only in the late nineteenth century that “comparative musicology” became an institutional science. An important role in this process was played by Carl Stumpf, a former pupil of Brentano’s who pioneered these researches in Berlin. Stumpf founded the Phonogrammarchiv to collect recordings of folk and extra-European music (...) and a dedicated journal, the Sammelbände für vergleichende Musikwissenschaft. Gifted in the field of science no less than in that of musicology, Stumpf developed an empirically-oriented approach to phenomenology, deeply divergent from Husserl’s and highly influential over the Berlin school of Gestalt psychology. A self-declared “outsider” among armchair philosophers, Stumpf experimentally investigated the perception of sounds and the origins of musical consonance. Developing the physiological studies of Ernst Weber on the sense of touch, Stumpf discovered that two sensations of tone, given at the same time, tend to mix in a certain degree. Musical consonance – he claimed – lays in this level of “tonal fusion”, not in the allegedly “natural” series of the harmonic partials of a vibrating chord, as suggested by the naturalists of all times from Pythagoras to Stumpf’s great contemporary Hermann Helmholtz. Accordingly, no musical system can claim for preponderance over the others: Stumpf’s researches in comparative musicology served to corroborate his theses on “tonal fusion” and the psychological foundations of consonance. Although Stumpf later revised and finally abandoned this theory, its permanent value lays in its opposition to dominant naturalistic approaches. The commitment for comparative musicology at the Berlin School is then no concession to a positivistic fashion for exoticism. The fundamentally Eurocentric stance of naturalistic theories of music is also fiercely contrasted by Stumpf’s pupil Erich Hornbostel, who suggests that music ought to be considered as culture, rather than as nature, and focuses attention on the eventually melting human cultures. The Berlin school flourished until the Nazis forced most of its exponents to emigration and, for tragically obvious reasons, heavily discouraged researches on these topics. (shrink)

The nature of representation has been a central but controversial issue of cognitive philosophy. After 2,500 years of reflection (cf. Rolf 2006), opinions are still divided. On the one hand, there are those who are convinced that we have reached a crisis of representation in the arts, the media, and cultural theory; on the other hand, representation has remained right at the top of the agenda of cognitive science and Artificial Intelligence research (cf. Nöth & Ljungberg, eds. 2003; Nöth 1997). (...) The words in which Daniel Dennett, in 1978, postulates the necessity for a new theory of representation as a foundation of cognitive science are symptomatic of a certain unease about the state of the art: "What is needed is.. (shrink)

Erwin Panofsky’s essay “Perspective as Symbolic Form” from 1924 is among the most widely commented essays in twentieth-century aesthetics and was discussed with regard to art theory, Renaissance painting, Western codes of depiction, history of optical devices, psychology of perception, or even ophthalmology. Strangely enough, however, almost nothing has been written about the philosophical claim implicit in the title, i.e. that perspective is a symbolic form among others. The article situates the essay within the intellectual constellation at Aby Warburg’s Kulturwissenschaftliche (...) Bibliothek in Hamburg, and analyzes the role of Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms for the members of the Warburg circle. Does perspective meet the requirements for becoming a further “symbolic form,” beyond those outlined by Cassirer? The article argues that, ultimately, perspective cannot possibly be a symbolic form; not because it does not meet Cassirer’s philosophical requirements, but rather, because that would uproot Cassirer’s overall project. While revisiting Panofsky with Cassirer unearths the wide-raging philosophical implication of the essay, revisiting Cassirer with Panofsky means to highlight the fundamentally perspectival nature of all symbolic forms. (shrink)

Context: Radical Constructivism is an issue that deeply divides the cognitive science community: most researchers reject it, but an increasing number do not. Problem: Constructivists stress that our knowledge starts from experience. Some (“ontic” constructivists) deny the existence of a mind-independent world, while others (“radical” constructivists) claim merely that, if such a world exists, we can know nothing about it. Both positions conflict with scientific realism. It is not clear that the conflict can be resolved. Method: This paper uses philosophical (...) argument to ask whether constructivism can be rationally preferred over realism in science. Results: Ontic constructivism cannot be disproved by any knock-down argument. Nevertheless, it is irrational to accept it, because it ignores the strategy of “inference to the best explanation”: realism is the best explanation of the successes of science. Radical constructivism, too, fails to explain these successes. Some radical constructivists have tried to offer theories more sympathetic to realism. For instance, Ernst von Glasersfeld sees science as a coherent ordering of experience, and appeals to Piagetian psychology as support. There are close similarities. But Piaget was also caught in a constructivist anti-realism, despite his attempt to evade it. Implications: The constructivist’s claim that scientific concepts and theories are generated by human minds is correct. But this important insight should not be used to deny realism, which is the best explanation of the many undeniable successes of science and engineering. (shrink)

The paper is a study of how graphic narratives (graphic novels and the comics) represent time in external visual space as well as in inner (mental) representations. Peirce’s semiotics is the main tool of research. After a survey of various approaches to the study of time in narratives in general and in graphic narratives in particular, an outline of the various aspects of the embodiment of time in space in general is given before the forms of the embodiment of time (...) in the space of graphic narratives is examined in detail. Signs of time are signs that represent time as their object and create mental representations of time as their interpretant. On this semiotic premise, the paper proposes a reinterpretation of Genette’s theory of time in narratives. A comparison with narratives in prose reveals that narrative time in graphic narratives evinces marked discontinuities in their spatial representation. The paper distinguishes between time as continuity, time as age, and points in time. It concludes that time as continuity is typically embodied in the form of spatial diagrams whereas time as age and points in time are mainly of the nature of indexical signs. The insights into the forms of embodiment of time in space derived from these premises are applied to examples from recent graphic novels and some traditional comics. (shrink)

Ecosemiotics is the study of sign processes (semioses) in relation to the natural environment in which they occur. The paper examines the cultural, biological, and evolutionary dimensions of ecosemioses on the basis of C. S. Peirce's theory of continuity between matter and mind and investigates the ecosemiotic dimensions of natural signs. Ecosemiotics and the semiotics of nature are distinguished from pansemiotism, and the coevolution of sign processes with their natural enviromnent is discussed as a determining factor of ecosemiosis.

The paper argues that contemporary consciousness studies can profit from Charles S. Peirce’s philosophy of consciousness. It confronts mainstream tendencies in contemporary consciousness studies, including those which consider consciousness as an unsolvable mystery, with Peirce’s phenomenological approach to consciousness. Peirce’s answers to the following contemporary issues are presented: phenomenological consciousness and the qualia, consciousness as self-controlled agency of humans, self-control and self-reflection, consciousness and language, self-consciousness and introspection, consciousness and the other, consciousness of nonhuman animals, and the question of a (...) quasi-consciousness of the physical universe. A detailed account of Peirce’s three modes of consciousness is presented: primisense, qualisense or feeling-consciousness, altersense, and medisense, the consciousness of cognition, thought, and reasoning. In contrast to consciousness studies that establish a rather sharp dividing line between conscious and unconscious states of mind, Peirce adopts the principle of synechism, the theory of continuity. For him, consciousness is a matter of degree. An important difference between Peirce’s concept of qualia and current theories of qualia in human consciousness is discussed. The paper shows how consciousness, according to Peirce, emerges from unconscious qualia and vanishes into equally unconscious habits. It concludes with a study of the roles of qualia, habit, and self-control in Peirce’s theory of signs, in particular in qualisigns and symbols, and the question of signs as quasi-conscious agents in semiosis. (shrink)